Donor Support for Civil Society Advocacy in BiH by Puljek-Shank, R.J. & Memišević, T.
PDF hosted at the Radboud Repository of the Radboud University
Nijmegen
 
 
 
 
The following full text is a publisher's version.
 
 
For additional information about this publication click this link.
http://hdl.handle.net/2066/122134
 
 
 
Please be advised that this information was generated on 2017-12-05 and may be subject to
change.
1Donor Support for Civil 
Society Advocacy in BiH
Authors: Randall Puljek-Shank, Tija Memišević
www.mirovna-akademija.org
INTRODUCTION
A strong civil society (CS) which is able to successfully advocate for groups of citizens is often seen as central to democrati-
zation and peacebuilding. Yet, after 17 years of donor support for CS, there are few signs of improvement in this direction. What 
have been the direct and indirect outcomes of previous efforts?  What have both donors and CS actors learned from this? Can 
donors constructively and effectively support change agents within CS?  
In order to better understand the topic, the authors approached and interviewed the 10 donors providing the most funds for 
CS and reviewed documents regarding their programs.1 In addition, 10 CS activists with experience with advocacy and receiving 
donor funds as well as a reputation for independence were also interviewed. The policy brief is also connected with an inde-
pendent research project related to the legitimacy of CS actors and is based on additional interviews and academic literature. 
The authors have attempted to understand donor constraints and rationales and to seek a balanced perspective on both donor 
responsibility and the limitations of Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) in the present Bosnian context, with the goal of making 
realistic recommendations.  The brief will address 3 key issues: which topics and forms of advocacy are most helpful; the effec-
tiveness of donor support in building advocacy capacity; and the role of the EU.
WHY SUPPORT ADVOCACY?2 
Support to CS in Bosnia needs to be 
considered from both the perspectives 
of democratization and peacebuilding. 
A strengthened advocacy role for CS is 
essential to governance-oriented3 de-
mocratization strategies.  Advocacy can 
shift power in favor of citizens and their 
needs in relation to ethnic elites and of-
ten unresponsive bureaucracies.  It can 
strengthen functions of CS left weak 
after donor support focused on service 
delivery and donor agendas.  Rights-
based advocacy (e.g. Sejdić-Finci case) 
can expose contradictions between 
the Dayton structure and international 
and European conventions that Bosnia 
has signed and EU standards which it 
should someday fulfill.  Finally, advoca-
cy can build legitimacy of CSOs based 
on their articulation of citizen concerns 
and recognized areas of competence.
In addition, a comprehensive review 
of case studies of peacebuilding by CS 
in different conflict stages including in 
BiH and focusing on the relevance and 
effectiveness of 7 CS functions rated 
advocacy as the most effective type 
of activity after conflicts with large 
scale violence.4 The study also found 
that mass mobilization and inclusion of 
large numbers of people drawing media 
attention were success factors for ad-
vocacy.  
In contrast, the review found that 
in-group socialization5 activities were 
often ineffective because they were 
performed by specialized NGOs which 
themselves did not have a democratic 
structure and therefore were not effec-
tive at advocating for democratic val-
ues.  The study advocates rather for en-
gagement through regular socialization 
institutions like schools.  Similarly re-
garding activities for social cohesion, it 
found that group divides often increase 
after peace agreements and that, 
“most peace- and relationship- orient-
ed initiatives were largely ineffective.” 
They were popular among donors but 
lack domestic ownership and focus on 
changing attitudes rather than behav-
iors. The remaining functions that were 
examined were service delivery which 
was not frequently an entry point for 
peacebuilding and monitoring of peace 
agreements, and protection which are 
less relevant in Bosnia at this time.
2  advocacy is used to refer to «all non-violent and legal 
activities designed to influence policies, practices and 
behaviour» (Advocacy and Policy Influencing for Social 
Change (Sarajevo: TACSO, 2011) including elections, mass 
mobilization, citizen action, lobbying, and legal suits.
3  “measures and initiatives designed specifically to build the 
partnership between sectors and to deliver a shift in hierarchies and 
the augmentation of the roles of non-state actors.” (BCSDN 2012)
4  Thania Paffenholz, “What Civil Society Can Contribute to 
Peacebuilding,” in Civil Society and Peacebuilding: A Critical 
Assessment, ed. by Thania Paffenholz (Boulder: Lynne 
Rienner, 2010), pp. 381–404.
5  In the Bosnian context largely focused on the culture of 
peace and socialization for democratic attitudes and for 
handling conflicts peacefully.
1 BCSDN, Donors’ Strategies and Practices in Civil Society Development in the Balkans. Civil Society: Lost in Translation? (Skopje, 2012) <http://www.balkancsd.net/resources-and-links/
publications/1005-balkan-civic-practices-8-donors-strategies-and-practices-in-civil-society-development-in-the-balkans-civil-society-lost-in-translation.html> [accessed 4 March 2012].  Donors 
contacted were the EU Delegation, USAID, BTD, CS Mott Foundation, NED, SIDA, German Embassy, Royal Netherlands Embassy, SDC, Open Society Fund.
2POLITICAL CONTEXT
Basic political processes in BiH 
have been deadlocked since 2006.  As 
a consequence, BiH has lagged behind 
in the democratization process as well 
as in EU integration. The constitutional 
structure established in Dayton in 1995 
has proven to be an insurmountable 
obstacle in that it has created perfect 
ground for ethno-nationalist politics 
which in reality developed into the pol-
itics of narrow interests, clientelism, 
corruption and control over political 
and public life by party leadership.  The 
BiH political system allows for the im-
proper political control over different 
branches of government, and provides 
political parties with tools to lock the 
political process and utilize the politics 
of threat and blackmail.  This is coupled 
with a lack of consistent strategy and 
political will by the EU, which still pre-
fers stability over democratization and 
ad-hoc reactions to threats of political 
instability (whether real or perceived) 
which has created the circumstances 
where the BiH political system has rap-
idly deteriorated including regression 
on already-achieved reform. 
Since 2006, for the lack of a better 
strategy, the EU has recognized the ma-
jor political parties as their only part-
ners in the EU integration process, for 
example the regular practice of negotiat-
ing all issues with political party leaders. 
Negotiations have been driven either by 
attempts to avoid or curb what are fre-
quently artificially-created political cri-
ses or by the desperate attempts by EU 
representatives to produce deliverables. 
As a consequence, those infrequent 
deals have fallen significantly short of 
European standards and norms thus 
further undermining the reform pro-
cess. A typical example is “structural di-
alogue on justice reform” initiated by the 
EU as a concession in the face of political 
blackmail by Milorad Dodik.  It continues 
to be a forum without a clear strategy 
where a framework for substantial and 
standards-driven justice reform is avoid-
ed for the benefit of continued conces-
sions to political leaders in their drive to 
undermine the justice sector and place it 
under full political control. 
The practice of negotiating with par-
ty leaders behind closed doors, along 
with the message coming from the 
EU - “Whatever your politicians agree 
upon is acceptable to us”, continues to 
undermine public institutions and to 
leave both citizens and CSOs in the dark 
regarding both the content of negoti-
ations and political responsibility for 
the positions taken and the outcome of 
the negotiations. A striking example is 
the negotiations over the implementa-
tion of Sejdić-Finci vs. BiH ruling of the 
ECHR, which took place in the first half 
of 2013.  All the talks took place behind 
closed doors with political party leaders 
and representatives without the public 
ever being informed of the content of 
talks.  Terms like “electoral college” were 
thrown around, while actually the “Cro-
at question” turned out to be the focus 
of talks. The only thing that was clear is 
that negotiations had not centered on 
the actual ruling nor been grounded in 
attempts to truly remove systemic dis-
crimination of the members of ethnic 
minorities. When negotiations failed, 
Enlargement Commissioner Stefan Füle 
visited BiH in April, and the citizens of 
BiH heard at a press conference that 
“some political parties were responsible 
for the failure of negotiations”.  Howev-
er, EU representatives are often quick to 
place responsibility on the shoulders of 
BiH citizens for their voting preferences. 
This isn’t the best approach if the goal 
is to develop a transparent democratic 
system with an informed, active, orga-
nized and politically-aware citizenry.
Importantly, parts of civil society 
have improved over the past period in 
terms of organizing, expertise and will-
ingness to voice dissent against dom-
inant political practices. However, the 
representatives of the EU, in order to 
avoid setting-off political leaders, for the 
most part have ignored civic initiatives 
and have not been willing to openly sup-
port them - even when they have been 
clearly in line with EU conditions, stan-
dards and values.  The Initiative for Free-
dom of Declaration, which was focused 
on adjusting the census questionnaire 
in accordance with recommendations 
by the International Monitoring Opera-
tion, was not openly supported by EU 
representatives, presumably because 
it would have potentially annoyed the 
dominant parties or led to a delay in 
the census. The Initiative sought free 
responses for the so-called identity 
questions, where the dominant political 
parties, in line with their narratives and 
ruling style, demonstrated a profound 
interest in guiding and limiting citizens 
in declaring their identity. 
Ever since the SDP-SNSD deal was 
made in the second half of 2012, parts 
of CS have been voicing their concern 
regarding planned legal changes.  Each 
one of the agreed changes undermine 
reforms that were already achieved and 
that were driven and in many cases paid 
for by the EU or its member states, and 
reinforce the powers and privileges of 
political parties at the expense of dem-
ocratic standards. They all aim for less 
transparency, less political responsibil-
ity, less influence of citizens within the 
election process, more political control 
over the judiciary, and significantly less 
fiscal discipline and viable economic 
planning.  This deal was met by rather 
meek responses by EU representatives 
and member states, with some even 
praising the elements of the deal, since 
“political leaders agreed”.  The only 
harsh criticism came from the Norwe-
gian and Swedish embassies on judicial 
matters. The deal in the meantime was 
put in motion, and changes of the Law 
on Conflict of Interest and Law on Public 
Procurement have already passed (fol-
lowing “emergency procedure” [sic!]) 
through the House of Representatives. 
The EU has reacted very weakly to the 
process and it done so on a law-by-law 
basis, avoiding addressing the bigger 
picture. These changes form a trend, 
not isolated incidents. However, EU rep-
resentatives and institutions, as well as 
a majority of donors, have not publical-
ly supported attempts to prevent the 
adoption of these laws nor to confront 
the package as a whole.
On the other hand, in temporarily 
preventing change to the Freedom of 
Information Act, through expert-based ww
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3STATE OF ADVOCACY
and well-organized actions, part of civil 
society demonstrated that they are ca-
pable of activism and tenacity without 
being project-driven or formally estab-
lished as a coalition. The participants 
simply acted in accordance with their 
respective missions and using existing 
resources. The initiative and coordina-
tion to prevent the change of FOIA has 
been “organic”.
The political parties have settled 
over the years into the existing system, 
without being challenged either from 
above (by the international commu-
nity, primarily the EU) or from below 
(by increasingly disempowered, mis-
informed and blackmailed citizens) for 
the past seven years. Recent devel-
This brief overview will focus on progressive advocacy efforts, while acknowl-
edging that this depends on key assumptions and leaves out significant parts of CS. 
Both academic and donor-funded reports typically cite a few successful examples 
but present these as being atypical.6 Some of those cases are formal successes 
– for example passing laws that however remain unimplemented because detailed 
regulations have not been issued or the implementation remains unfunded, which is 
most likely due to the lack of political will and low level of competence. CS activists 
reported more success in blocking proposed changes (i.e. the SDP-HDZ agreement 
in July 2012) than in proposing new initiatives.  Multiple interviewees commented 
that the most significant successes were achieved together with international ac-
tors (i.e. direction election of mayors), in which international pressure played a key 
role.  
There are multiple efforts to provide, analyze, and disseminate information (i.e. 
about public expenditures, corruption, party platforms) but few efforts of sustained 
advocacy, attempts to talk with and influence policymakers, constituency identifi-
cation and building, or ongoing informing of the public and affected constituencies.7 
As put by Belloni and Hemmer, “For the majority of local organizations ‘advocacy’ is 
translated into complaints against the government or the international community, 
without a sustained constructive engagement. Rarely do NGOs engage in coordinat-
ed and strategic approaches and follow-through from initial events to actually pass-
ing laws or monitoring their implementation.”8  
On the other hand, a high unemployment rate and citizen dependence on the 
political parties for secure public jobs, social benefits and other privileges, means 
there are poor conditions for organizing of citizens into independent interest-based 
or professional CSOs (membership-based CSOs such as unions, business, farm-
ers’, or parents’ associations). In addition the lack of mechanisms and political cul-
ture which foster the responsiveness of politicians and government responsibility 
makes successful advocacy difficult. These factors contribute to a general lack of 
success in mobilization for either protests, public pressure, or activism.
opments call for more courage among 
donors and international actors to rec-
ognize and publically support parts of 
civil society as their “natural” partner 
in transition and democratization. It 
should be kept in mind that under the 
given circumstances and institutional 
arrangements, political parties have no 
interest in changing the status quo and 
giving up on the power and privileges 
that they currently enjoy.  Every ne-
gotiation between the EU and political 
parties is just a stalling tactic.  But the 
damage they create for reforms in BiH 
and the emancipation of citizens and 
civil society are far-reaching.  Every is-
sue is political in BiH, since the system 
is designed so as to make it possible 
for every issue to be the object of polit-
ical games and rent-seeking.  Likewise, 
the activities of both CS and the EU are 
political, and only by supporting “con-
troversial and political” issues, guided 
by EU standards and norms, can the 
foundations of the system be reformed 
in such way to establish the grounds 
for substantial democratization and 
successful integration into the EU.  Im-
portantly, before CS can assume its role 
in the political system, amongst other 
things by advocating for constructive 
and quality solutions through regular 
channels, political parties must find 
themselves under strong pressure from 
both the public and international actors 
in order to even consider both CS and 
the EU as partners and adopt their pri-
orities. 
6  Roberto Belloni, State Building and International 
Intervention in Bosnia (London, New York: Routledge, 2007); 
Ismet Sejfija, NVO Sektor u BiH: Tranzicijski Izazovi (Tuzla: 
Bosanska Riječ, 2009); IBHI, Why Is NGO Potential Unrealised? 
(Sarajevo, 2012); Ivana Howard, “Unfinished Business: Civil 
Society,” in Unfinished Business: The Western Balkans and 
the International Community, ed. by Vedran Dzihic and Daniel 
Hamilton (Washington, D.C.: Center for Transatlantic Relations, 
2012), pp. 35–48.
7  Assessment Report on Advocacy Capacity of Membership 
Based CSOs in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Sarajevo: TACSO, 2012) 
<http://www.tacso.org/doc/ba_ar_advocacy_capacity_en.pdf>; 
Roberto Belloni and Bruce Hemmer, “Bosnia-Herzegovina: 
Civil Society in a Semi-Protectorate,” in Civil Society and 
Peacebuilding: A Critical Assessment, ed. by Thania Paffenholz 
(Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2010), pp. 129–152.
8  Belloni and Hemmer, p. 141.
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THE PRESENT MOMENT APPROACHES TO STRENGTHENING CS ADVOCACY
There is some evidence of a search 
for new approaches of supporting CS 
in multi-year guidelines issued by the 
EU DG Enlargement9 and USAID.10 Some 
of the new directions in the former are 
support for longer-term contracts, mov-
ing away from project-based support to 
a more flexible approach that fosters 
partnership and coalition building, do-
ing more to reach out to grassroots 
organizations, and better reflection of 
the perspective of social partners and 
professional and business associations 
in the Commission’s work.  USAID’s RFA 
envisions 10-12 CSOs that “truly rep-
resent their sectors” which will each 
lead a formal or informal issue-based 
network that can “mobilize multi-sec-
tor reform-minded stakeholders”. A 
final example of new approaches by 
donor organizations is the Open Soci-
ety Fund which after many years of 
significant investment in large NGOs as 
implementing agencies now focuses its 
support on identifying and increasing 
capacity of interest-based CSOs (such 
as parents’ and teachers’ associations 
regarding inclusive education).
There is also evidence of change in 
the approach to organizing and poten-
tial for progressive mobilizing by CS 
organizations.  There are more informal 
issue-based coalitions11 and interviews 
revealed more organic approaches to 
organizing while avoiding or minimizing 
the bureaucratic requirements of proj-
ect-based funding. Moreover protests 
like “Park je naš“ in Banja Luka and 
JMBG in Sarajevo and other cities have 
for the first time mobilized thousands of 
citizens around the common good with-
out being initiated or used by political 
actors, or being programmed and spon-
sored by donors.
In order to better understand the connection between previous donor support 
and the advocacy capacity of CS, this section will summarize theories of change 
within donor-sponsored programs and some of the weaknesses that have been ob-
served.    
• Formalization of Government - CS relationships under the label “cooperation” 
via compacts (sporazumi) at various levels and a national-level Civil Society 
Board which can be understood as a way to build legitimacy of CSOs and respon-
siveness of government to CS requests.  The weaknesses of these approaches 
are that they require “representatives” of CS which are frequently self-appoint-
ed and not broadly accepted by government or CSOs.  The resulting compacts 
have remained largely formal and there is little evidence that these have become 
platforms for successful advocacy. Rather those CSOs that receive government 
funding as a result receive it for providing services but are at risk of sacrificing 
their autonomy in exchange for the financing that they receive.
• Numerous institutional mechanisms for CS participation such as Youth Coun-
cils, Bulldozer initiative, Parents’ and Students’ Councils have been introduced. 
The limitations of this approach are visible when external funding and organizing 
infrastructure is ended frequently leading to a reduction or ceasing of activity.  
• Long-term (5+ year) financial support where some donors provide core insti-
tutional support12 while others require project applications but allow flexibility to 
divert to other activities while covering overhead costs.13 The theory of change 
appears to be that carefully-selected CSOs will develop into effective advocates 
if provided financial autonomy.
• The TACSO project has generated reports analyzing systemic weaknesses of 
CS (advocacy capacity of membership-based CSOs, networks and coalitions, fi-
nancial statements of CSOs)14 and provided financial and facilitative support for 
events for strategic planning of existing networks & coalitions.
• Projects which are founded on building and promoting the technical exper-
tise of CS in order to be an “equal” and recognized partner in policy discussions 
with government.  While this may build more openness for interaction between 
government and CS over time, a weakness is that good analysis doesn’t mean 
willingness to make decisions that may be unpopular or challenge established 
interests.  It is extremely rare for technical expertise to lead to better policies in 
the absence of public pressure.
9  DG Enlargement Guidelines for EU Support to Civil Society 
in Enlargement Countries, 2014-2020 (Brussels: EU DG 
Enlargement, 2013) <http://www.europa.rs/upload/ELARG 
Guidelines CS support final draft 130513.doc>.
10  USAID, RFA: CSSP in BiH (Sarajevo, 2013) <http://www.
grants.gov/search/search.do?mode=VIEW&oppId=227573>.
11  Assessment Report on CSO Networks/Platforms/
Initiatives/Coalitions in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Sarajevo: 
TACSO, 2012) <http://www.tacso.org/doc/ba_ar_cso_networks_
en.pdf>.
12  SIDA, Mott Foundation.
13  NED.
14  TACSO, Bosnia & Herzegovina Needs Assessment Report (Sarajevo, 2010) <http://www.tacso.org/doc/02_nar_ba.pdf> 
[accessed 4 June 2012]; Assessment Report on CSO Networks/Platforms/Initiatives/Coalitions in Bosnia and Herzegovina; 
Assessment Report on Advocacy Capacity of Membership Based CSOs in Bosnia and Herzegovina; Aida Daguda, Milan Mrđa and 
Slaviša Prorok, Annual Financial Reports of Civil Society Organizations in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Sarajevo, 2013) <http://tacso.
org/doc/Annual_Financial_Report_BiH_2011.pdf>.
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MISSING AWARENESS IN MANY DONOR PROGRAMS
KEY ISSUES
“Ignoring politics does not render intervention neutral at all, but instead has
the effect of reinforcing the status quo”.15
Many donor programs do not adequately consider important characteristics of CS, or seem limited in their ability to imple-
ment new models.  Grassroots and interest-based CSOs are often both politicized (answering to political parties and actors) 
and polarized (either accepting of ethnic narratives or divided into competing blocs). These are often the very CSOs which key 
donors see as central to the success of CS advocacy.  At times, donor- supported CSOs with a stated goal of supporting better pol-
icies and more responsive government have appeared to advocate for party positions, leading to a long-term undermining of the 
independence of advocacy and watchdog efforts as perceived by the public. Finally, organic cooperation with broad local own-
ership among CSOs is difficult and rare, and donor programs which respond to this lack of cooperation by providing incentives 
for networks and coalition have ended up fostering formal networks that exist largely on paper and often only while the project 
lasts.  In contrast, organic means that they were supported by legitimate and credible CSOs with existing results and evidence 
of a clear mission, goals and visibility, in contrast to those that result from top-down design processes.  (Recommendation #6)
Donors’ frequent use of Results-Based Management (RBM) approaches in project applications with an advocacy focuses 
have supported attention to immediate outputs like web sites, manuals, and policy studies given the difficulty and extended 
timeframes of measuring outcomes. Project applications are often assessed based on technical criteria without adequate regard 
to the context of ongoing societal conflicts and their potential positive or negative impact on them.16 In addition, the assessment 
and selection processes suffer from limiting political assumptions about the existing system and potential for change.  A cri-
tique of this approach is that, “engaging professional NGOs in apolitical projects that predominantly side-step causes and focus 
instead on ameliorating the effects, or making changes at the margins without directly challenging nationalist elites or existing 
hierarchies, are destined to have limited impact in climates of corruption and intimidation.”17 
Donors have frequently critiqued professional CSOs as being donor-driven under the keyword “usual suspects”, while some 
acknowledge that previous donor practices have rewarded the establishment of such organizations.  In regards to advocacy ac-
tivities an observed lack of advocacy skills and motivation18 comes after 17 years of CS “capacity-building” interventions, leading 
to a present question whether more of the same will lead to different results? (Recommendation #13)  To put it critically, how 
could externally-designed change initiatives implemented via short-term grants by weakly-coordinated organizations with low 
legitimacy and focused on issues of indirect concern to most citizens become effective advocates?
Which topics and forms of 
advocacy are most helpful?
Designing advocacy programs or 
selecting from among advocacy pro-
posals requires assessments on the 
part of donors or intermediary organi-
zations about which topics and forms 
of advocacy will be most helpful and 
which organizations will be best able to 
implement them.  As articulated earlier 
in this policy brief, this is a political pro-
cess and denying this while claiming 
neutrality supports the status quo. 
 
One predominant approach in do-
nor-funded programs is rights-based 
advocacy founded on the idea of uni-
versal rights with a focus on certain ex-
cluded populations (for example work 
on social inclusion, LGBT rights, Roma 
rights, and gender equality).  Without 
denying that these are issues in which 
BiH must achieve change in order to 
eventually become an EU member, the 
primary critique to these approaches is 
one of relevance and priority.  Focusing 
primary attention to these efforts has 
been likened to re-arranging the deck 
chairs on the Titanic.  Until advocacy 
efforts can achieve palpable benefits 
for larger groups of BiH citizens and 
challenge unresponsive politicians, 
such efforts will remain at the margins. 
Finally such efforts may be attractive 
to donors because they are perceived 
as having low political risk because it 
allows international actors to maintain 
cooperation and good relationships 
15   Willemijn Verkoren and Mathijs van Leeuwen, “Complexities and Challenges for Civil Society Building in Post-Conflict Settings,” Journal of Peacebuilding & Development, 7 (2012), 81-94 (p. 85). Citing Jude 
Howell and Jenny Pearce, “Civil Society, Democracy, and the State: The Americanization of the Debate,” in Civil Society and Development: A Critical Exploration. (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2001).
16  The Missing Peace: The Need for a Long Term Strategy in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Saferworld and Nansen Dialogue Centre Sarajevo, 2010) <http://www.saferworld.org.uk/The missing peace - 
English reduced.pdf>.
17   Adam Fagan, Europe’s Balkan Dilemma: Paths to Civil Society or State-building? (London: I.B. Tauris, 2010), p. 191.
18   Assessment Report on Advocacy Capacity of Membership Based CSOs in Bosnia and Herzegovina; USAID.
6with political leaders while maintaining 
the appearance of neutrality by ignor-
ing the elephant in the room.  
         
A second approach to advocacy is 
based on the potential of mobilizing 
interest-based and other CSOs around 
issues of common interest. Such is-
sue-based advocacy in theory benefits 
from the legitimacy and local owner-
ship of such CSOs in order to influence 
policymakers.  In practice this approach 
has several difficulties.  Such CSOs are 
often politicized and in addition may 
depend on the state for financial sup-
port reducing their autonomy and the 
leaders of such organizations may be 
part of the same elites that benefit from 
the status quo and make substantive 
change difficult.  Furthermore does 
donor-supported issue-based advoca-
cy pursue goals that are the top prior-
ities for the affected groups? Or are 
they instrumentalized to pursue steps 
advocated for by the predominantly 
neoliberal19 analysis of the donors? 
Agendas set by donors may be less ef-
fective because they don’t correspond 
to the most pressing needs, while there 
is also a tendency for CSOs to take the 
easier path in selecting agendas.  These 
tendencies can be mitigated by assess-
ment methodologies that include CSO 
legitimacy and credibility, by support 
for organic initiatives, and different 
forms of capacity-building. (Recom-
mendations #1, #6, #13)      
A third but less common approach 
to advocacy is focused on communi-
ty-level needs (health, environment, 
education, public services) often or-
ganized by grassroots CSOs.20 Such 
advocacy may have a higher chance 
of success and engage CSOs beyond 
the “usual suspects”. The immediate 
outcomes however are by definition of 
narrow geographic and thematic scope 
and it is difficult to evaluate the wider 
impact (potentially capacity gained for 
future advocacy and strengthened so-
cial capital).  
Rights-based, issue-based, and 
community-based advocacy can all be 
important components of democratiza-
tion. The authors acknowledge the po-
tential in the less commonly supported 
interest-based and community-based 
approaches to advocacy. But at the end 
of the day, selecting which approach 
to take to advocacy may be second-
ary.  The more important questions are 
whether Bosnian CSOs are setting the 
advocacy agenda and whether donors 
are willing to support topics they view 
as “politically risky”.  In our interviews, 
CS activists reported not receiving sup-
port for such topics.  When asked what 
is most important to tell donors, one 
response by a CS activist was, “Grow 
some backbone!” This reflects what can 
be labelled as more focus in present 
programs on stability over democratiza-
tion. The weakness of “stability” based 
in the present deadlocked and unre-
sponsive political system may mean 
that more support is required for deeper 
democratization.  In addition, “stability” 
isn’t delivering on the EU agenda.  Stron-
ger and consistent support of organic 
initiatives is one step in this direction 
(Recommendations #9, #10).
Effectiveness of donor 
support in building 
advocacy capacity
Current strategies for CS Develop-
ment by the EU and USAID focus on 
working with more grassroots mem-
bership-based organizations and is-
sue-based networks.  Yet given the 
procedural and reporting requirements, 
this has been and most likely will con-
tinue to be done via a re-granting pro-
cess. Intermediary organizations are 
considered to be necessary in order 
to manage more smaller grants, to be 
more knowledgeable about the needs, 
to allow applications in Bosnian/Croa-
tian/Serbian, and to be able to respond 
faster to initial requests and requests 
for changes.  At the same time such 
intermediary organizations require re-
sources and their institutional imper-
ative to sustain themselves can sub-
sume the development imperatives of 
cooperation, information sharing, and 
mutual learning.21 Specifically such 
professional intermediary CSOs need 
grassroots and membership-based 
CSOs to demonstrate their impact and 
are needed for their access to funds 
and information.  This establishes the 
conditions for instrumental (based on 
and limited to financial interest) rath-
er than partnership-based (based on 
common values and goals) relation-
ships. The authors’ assessment is that 
this dynamic cannot be eliminated but 
rather mitigated through donor influ-
ence over assessment methodologies 
that include CSO legitimacy and credi-
bility, considering providing core fund-
ing and allocating smaller funds for ad-
hoc activities. (Recommendations #1, 
#2, #3)
Existing grassroots and issue-based 
advocacy efforts reveal a common lack 
of expertise and skills which are cru-
cial for effective advocacy, both by in-
dividual organizations and coalitions/
networks/groups. Capacity building 
programs have largely focused on 
packaged trainings and on technical 
aspects.  This can be improved by con-
sidering new forms of capacity-building 
support and emphasizing relevant ex-
pertise. (Recommendations #7, #13)
There is a potential for idealization 
of membership-based and grassroots 
organizations which are often repre-
sented as having high legitimacy.  While 
some such organizations do have high 
legitimacy, others do not because they 
are seen by the public or their mem-
bers as being beholden to political ac-
tors which prevents them from being 
tenacious advocates for either their 
members or a broader public interest.22 
There is a danger that broad support for 
such CSOs can repeat what is perceived 
as an earlier mistake, “to assume that 
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19  Characterized by with a focus on a diminished role for the 
state, importance of CSOs as service providers, and bounded 
range of valid CSO actions within the frameworks of a 
democratic system, human rights and free market economy. 
John Harriss, Depoliticizing Development: The World Bank and 
Social Capital (New Delhi: Leftword Books, 2001).
20  See Assessment Report on Advocacy Capacity of 
Membership Based CSOs in Bosnia and Herzegovina. For 
examples.
21  Michael Edwards, “Have NGOs ‘Made a Difference?’: From 
Manchester to Birmingham with an Elephant in the Room,” in 
Can NGOs Make a Difference?: The Challenge of Development 
Alternatives, ed. by Anthony Bebbington, Samuel Hickey, and 
Diana Mitlin (London, New York: Zed Books, 2008).
22  30 interviews were conducted with representatives 
of CSOs, donors and international organizations, and 
government at all levels in fall, 2012.
7by promoting the [NGO] sector in gen-
eral, a strong and powerful CS would 
emerge which could counterbalance 
ethno-politics driven by state institu-
tions and nationalist political parties.”23 
In addition, seeking such CSOs to fund 
has the potential outcome of generating 
new organizations or professionalizing 
existing ones in order to meet donor 
requirements.  This can be mitigated by 
better awareness and support of exist-
ing initiatives and assessment method-
ologies that include CSO legitimacy and 
credibility (Recommendations #10, #1). 
Finally it is common for advocacy 
efforts to be dismissed by politicians 
and some Bosnian citizens as repre-
senting “well-paid foreign mercenar-
ies”. Although all CSOs should provide 
the same financial information to the 
public as they are required to provide to 
the relevant authorities, in practice this 
is rare. Donors could help this change 
process by requiring basic financial 
transparency on the part of their grant-
ees (Recommendation #5).
6-24 month project applications are 
the most common form of grant support 
to CS, although a few donors provide 
long-term and core support.  Donors us-
ing public funds also have regulations 
which stipulate the kinds of expenses 
can be covered (whether these include 
overhead costs or to what degree) and 
their reporting requirements.  Despite 
the critiques of the “project” approach 
mentioned above under “missing 
awareness”, short-term project appli-
cations will remain an important form 
of donor support.  CS activists noted 
that while donors initiate competitive 
application processes, they often sup-
port known (previously-supported) or-
ganizations and saw this as an effect 
of the closed nature of donors for new 
approaches and new organizations.  In 
addition, they see project administra-
tion as a limiting factor in the effec-
tiveness of their work (because of time 
constraints and linear planning frame-
works that don’t adequately reflect out-
comes or constrain ability to dynam-
ically respond).  Donors on the other 
hand indicated that there are few “re-
liable and professional” organizations, 
while some have adapted a strategy of 
adjusting the competitive, short-term 
project model by intentionally support-
ing the same organizations for multiple 
subsequent grants.  If changing the 
short-term project model isn’t possible, 
some of these weaknesses can be mit-
igated by assessment processes that 
place more emphasis on the existing 
results of the applicant and the rela-
tionship of a given project to previous 
initiatives and other supporting CSOs. 
(Recommendations #1, #4, #10)
A final area where donors can improve 
effectiveness relates to the explicit finan-
cial and implicit moral support that gov-
ernments receive via donor-funded re-
form projects.  Donors reported that they 
rarely require government institutions to 
consult with CS and are rarely asked to 
use connections with such institutions 
to facilitate CS advocacy efforts.  Ana-
lyzing the focus on institution building, 
particularly on improving the functioning 
of national and entity governments that 
can be observed in both bilateral and 
EU-funded efforts is beyond the scope of 
this brief.  However, there does seem to 
be a missed opportunity to strengthen CS 
advocacy by donor agencies supporting 
CSOs to better inform the public about in-
stitution-building efforts, strengthening 
intra-agency and inter-agency links, and 
including regular CS consultation in their 
design as recommended by best-practic-
es (Recommendation #11).
The present common practice is 
that strategy documents which do re-
quire CS participation are often put on 
the shelf after completed or are only im-
plemented with donor funds, raising the 
question whether governments sup-
port them at all or how sustainable the 
changes will be. Furthermore require-
ments that institutions strengthen con-
sultation mechanisms with CS remain 
unimplemented24 or are pro forma (for 
example Parliament of BiH hearings on 
constitutional reform).  The successful 
establishment and functioning of con-
sultation channels between CS and gov-
ernment and institution would require 
continuous advocacy for and monitor-
ing both by CSOs and donors/diplomatic 
representatives.
In addition, numerous activists in 
our interviews asked why foreign dip-
lomats regularly meet with politicians 
that are not responsive to CS requests, 
or do so without raising these requests 
as issues.  Because of the foreign inter-
vention and ongoing role of foreign gov-
ernments (EUSR, OHR), donor support 
for CS cannot be assessed separately 
from diplomatic support. Finally, in do-
nor-funded advocacy projects, CS activ-
ists reported a lack of diplomatic sup-
port for policy analysis performed on 
the behalf of donors.  CSO advocacy can 
be strengthened by better application of 
the normative and symbolic power by 
embassies and diplomats in support of 
international and EU standards and the 
common good. (Recommendation #9)   
What role can the
EU play?
As the largest donor and government 
negotiating partner in the EU-acces-
sion process, the EU has the potential 
to play a significant role, a role that can 
be positive.   A comprehensive review of 
EU assistance 2000-2009 comes to the 
conclusion, “The most important finding 
of the study, and in a sense the most 
damning critique of the assistance, is 
that projects designed to enlist state and 
non-state actors and to lay the founda-
tions of governance partnerships, bar 
a few notable exceptions, fail to deliver 
wholeheartedly on this objective.”25 
The draft guidelines for support to 
CS 2014-2020 indicates the intention 
to provide new forms of assistance 
and awareness of some of the weak-
nesses outlined in this policy brief. 
However, the new direction as outlined 
includes potential pitfalls.  The authors 
are skeptical whether the professional 
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23  Thania Paffenholz and Christoph Spurk, Civil Society, Civic 
Engagement, and Peacebuilding (Washington, D.C., 2006), p. 
17 <http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTCPR/Resources/
WP36_web.pdf> [accessed 1 July 2011].
24  For example see EU DG Enlargement, Ad Hoc Evaluation 
of the CARDS Programme Country: Bosnia and Herzegovina/
Sectors: Democratic Stabilisation Good Governance Economic 
and Social Development (European Commission, 2008), p. 
40.
25  Fagan, p. 188.
8NGOs which currently receive the bulk 
of EU CS funds will be able to increase 
their autonomy, representativeness, 
accountability, and effectiveness as 
called for in the 2014-2020 Guidelines, 
because of both external (lack of so-
cial capital, existing low legitimacy) 
and internal (limitation to short-term 
projects) constraints.  In addition, as-
sessing these characteristics is diffi-
cult and may not be consistent with the 
technical forms of application assess-
ment currently in place (see “Missing 
awareness”). This can be mitigated by 
assessment methodologies that factor 
in organizational legitimacy and credi-
bility (Recommendation #1).  
In terms of fulfilling the conditions 
of funding there is also a systemic chal-
lenge because there are few ways for 
new CSOs that may better fulfill the 
guidelines to gain competence in EU 
grant proposals and, in addition, such 
proposals require co-financing.  Thus, 
“As EU calls for projects become more 
specific and demanding, requiring 
greater knowledge, capacities and great 
amount of co-financing, their success 
will become ever more dependent on 
the capacity training and core funding 
provided by the host of small donors and 
foundations that have operated across 
the territory.”26  One way this can be mit-
igated is improved donor coordination 
especially when it comes to policy on a 
sectoral basis (Recommendation #14).
In addition, the guidelines call for 
consultation with “social partners”. 
While such consultations may make 
the EU Delegation more accessible 
In preparing this report, the au-
thors have attempted to understand 
the constraints that donors operate 
under and the limits of donor support. 
Accordingly the following recommen-
dations are intentionally modest steps 
that the authors believe can be imple-
mented.
again they involve assessments of 
which are acceptable and accepted so-
cial partners given the environment of 
politicized and polarized CSOs making 
claims of representation.  A common 
response to suggestions for inclusion 
of more perspectives is that the par-
ties have democratic legitimacy via 
elections.  However, democratic control 
does not lie only in the electoral pro-
cess.  The EU should communicate with 
other important social actors which are 
the end beneficiaries of the integration 
process.  Only communication with dif-
ferent stakeholders such as farmers’ 
and business associations and CSOs 
focusing on particular issues can pro-
vide for multiple views and advocating 
for additional interests against the nar-
row interests of political parties.  Such 
sectoral and professional CSOs should 
be partners of the EU in assessing, de-
signing and promoting reforms in their 
respective sectors.  In addition, if the 
EU is clearer in communication with 
the public and more clearly states the 
conditions for EU membership this will 
strengthen standards-based advocacy. 
(Recommendation #12).
All the intended improvements in 
the new Guidelines will however not 
produce the desired result unless there 
is a willingness on the side of the EU to 
finance and support projects and initia-
tives which aim at systemic democratic 
reform.  This applies to all donors but 
particularly to the EU because of its in-
creasing importance.  This only means 
supporting CS initiatives which are con-
sistent within the framework of EU inte-
gration (Recommendation #10).  
1. In assessing projects and pro-
grams: Increase efforts to assess legit-
imacy and credibility of implementing 
organizations.  For membership-based 
CSOs this can be done by talking to 
stakeholders such as beneficiaries and 
other actors in the affected communi-
ty.  For other CSOs this can be done by 
assessing autonomy, visibility, and ex-
pertise of publications and public state-
ments.  The areas of focus for all CSOs 
can be compared to their stated mis-
sion.  There are too many organizations 
that look good mainly on paper and 
have learned the craft of writing project 
proposals.  Although such assessments 
may appear subjective they provide 
helpful information for assessing the 
potential impact.
2. Provide longer-term core funding 
to organizations that have proven them-
selves over time through project imple-
mentation and impact.  The time has 
come in BiH, with certain CSOs establish-
ing themselves as authentic, competent 
and active, to provide for more flexibility 
and freedom in designing activities.  If 
donors don’t think there are such mis-
sion-focused organizations, why do they 
continue to award project funds?
3. Provide small ad-hoc funding that 
would support activities that are a dy-
namic response to an urgent issue (i.e. 
pressing legal changes, and organized 
support to citizens/colleagues on a lo-
cal level on a particular local issue).
RECOMMENDATIONS
Regarding program 
design and assessment 
procedures
26  BCSDN, p. 54.
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94. In accordance with the “do no 
harm” principle: increase awareness of 
existing areas of advocacy and cooper-
ation so that if possible, new initiatives 
strengthen rather than weaken them.
5. Require transparency - at a min-
imum require grantees to be publically 
transparent with their annual financial 
statements.
6. Programs to engage with inter-
est-based CSOs should avoid previous 
mistakes with coalitions and networks. 
First, only legitimate and credible or-
ganizations should be supported in 
conjunction with careful work in capac-
ity building. Second, those CSOs should 
be supported in line with EU standards 
and norms (for example, associations 
of farmers should be supported in line 
with agricultural policies which fit into 
the framework of the EU integration pro-
cess).
7. Donor programs should include 
a preference for advocacy efforts that 
effectively engage subject experts and 
build expertise.  This could be research 
done as requested by interest-based 
CSOs or think-tank efforts that sub-
stantively engage government through 
either pressure or communication 
through regular channels as well as en-
gaging other CS actors.  
  
8. Donors should not limit their view 
on advocacy as only performable by co-
alitions/initiatives/groups.  CSOs should 
not be forced into coalitions by program 
design, but their individual efforts, ca-
pacity, expertise, and mission should 
be supported.  In addition to other bene-
fits, this establishes the foundations for 
organic initiatives and coalitions.
Regarding non-financial 
support
9. Our key recommendation is better 
use of symbolic and normative power, 
particularly for donors connected with 
embassies and diplomatic representa-
tives.   CS activists seek both donor and 
diplomatic statements that reflect clear 
and consistent principles and stan-
dards. Foreign statements are most 
effective when done in a strategic way 
(multiple embassies, key issues).  This 
includes providing support for the out-
comes of supported projects.
10. Financial and declarative sup-
port for organic initiatives and coali-
tions, whether ad hoc or long term, if 
they are consistent with democratiza-
tion, human rights, and standards and 
values relevant to the EU integration 
process. This recommendation includes 
more courage to support such initia-
tives even if they may be “politically 
risky” because this helps CSOs to point 
out where present policies are inconsis-
tent with BiH’s existing commitments.
  
11. Strengthen both intra-agency 
and inter-agency links between largely 
separate donor programs focused on 
institution-building and CS and ensure 
that institution-building programs in-
clude substantive CS consultation.
12. The EU should abandon the prac-
tice of negotiating with party leaders 
behind closed doors and encourage the 
return of political processes into institu-
tions.  Only transparency can allow for 
CSOs to assume their intended position 
in the society. The EU should also com-
municate with other important social 
actors which are the final beneficiaries 
of the integration process.  Only com-
munication with different stakehold-
ers can provide for multiple views and 
advocating for other interests against 
the narrow interests of political parties. 
In addition, the EU should be clearer in 
communication with the public and in 
stating the conditions that BiH must 
meet in order to join the EU. This would 
be a reference that CS can use in advo-
cating standards and reforms, as well 
as a helpful tool to put pressure on and 
monitor the government.
13. Support alternatives to pack-
aged one-off advocacy capacity-build-
ing training. At a minimum capaci-
ty-building needs to happen when and 
for the issues identified by CSOs that 
will use the skills and knowledge.
Regarding donor 
coordination
14. Continue efforts at donor coor-
dination with an emphasis on sectoral 
coordination, in order to avoid project 
duplication and make better use of do-
nor coordination forums to foster reflec-
tion and learning. Improved donor coor-
dination is a common recommendation, 
yet there are numerous practical dif-
ficulties – it depends on individuals to 
take the initiative, is easier with smaller 
donors with a single contact person, 
and can function at level of information 
exchange without dialogue leading to 
deeper reflection and learning. Howev-
er, additional efforts are needed.  
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